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Getting In Line: Justin Martyr,
St. Augustine, and the Project of
Integral Christian Scholarship

by Dr. Robert Sweetman

Christianity did not begin as the religion of

philosophers, grammarians, experts in the law
and forensic rhetoric, i.e, as the religion of the
scholastic professions in the ancient
Mediterranean world of the New Testament.
However, early on it did attract people of that
sort. We know, for example, of some early converts who were interested in and gave themselves
to philosophy, or the love of wisdom. They asked
questions about the relationship between the wisdom of their new-found faith and the schooled
love of wisdom they took with them into it. The
second century Christian Justin Martyr provides
us an example in his Dialogue with Trypho the
Dr. Robert Sweetman is Professor of the History of
Philosophy at the Institute for Christian Studies in
Toronto.
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Jew.1 Let us look over his shoulder.
As Justin tells the story, he is walking along
one day when a man and his friends salute him.
They address him as philosopher, for he is
dressed as such, bearing the pallium or philosopher’s cloak. Justin asks the man what he wants,
and the man says that a renowned Cynic had
taught him to engage philosophers in conversation at every opportunity, for, in doing so, he will
either learn something of benefit or the philosopher will, and, whatever the case, it will be well
for both.
Justin next asks the man who he is, and the man
identifies himself as Trypho, a Jewish refugee. At
this, Justin’s eyebrows rise, and he asks why
Trypho would think to benefit from a philosopher
when he has Moses and the prophets. The question could equally be asked of Justin himself, as
he well knows, adding or perhaps substituting
Jesus Christ and the Apostles.
Trypho’s answer begins by identifying common ground between philosophy and the revelation of Moses and the prophets: “do not the
philosophers [too] speak always about God? Do
they not constantly propose questions about his
unity and providence? Is this not the task of philosophy, to inquire about the Divine?”2
Justin admits the common ground but then
insists that it is not neutral ground. His admission
and insistence are designed to point out that the
philosopher’s theological inquiry and the
prophets’ inspired reception of divine revelation
do indeed share a common subject, the divine and
its ways in the world, but that the philosopher’s
theological inquiry constitutes a getting rather
than a receiving of knowledge and that this pos-

ture or attitude orients one’s whole approach to
the shared subject in ways that make a substantive difference. Justin gets at his point by emphasizing the relative fallibility of the philosophers’
theological inquiry. “But,” he says, “the majority
of the philosophers have simply neglected to
inquire whether there is one or even several gods,
and whether or not a divine providence actually
takes care of us, as if this knowledge were unnecessary to our happiness.”3 He goes on to list other
important mistakes that are made even by those
who do deal with these issues, mistakes that cut
the ground out from under right, wrong, and the
just relations between human beings and with
respect to God.
Trypho plays out his role as straight man and
asks Justin to explain where he stands on these
central issues. He gladly tells his story. He
begins by praising philosophy as “one’s greatest
possession,” and as “most precious in the sight of
God to whom it alone leads us and to whom it
unites us”; as a consequence, Justin views those
who apply themselves to philosophy as “in truth
. . . holy men.”4 However, there are many schools
of philosophy, and they bicker over how one is to
love wisdom. Justin accounts for these many
schools in a story of gigantic beginnings whittled
down to size. We who come after the larger-thanlife founders mistake our giantish heroes for wisdom herself. Hence, we parcel up their common
enterprise, preserving the founders’ opinions as if
they were wisdom’s, full stop.
Indeed, Justin’s own biography illustrates the
point.5 He had begun his pursuit of wisdom with
a Stoic but learned nothing new about God. He
then turned to an Aristotelian who insisted on
tuition for his instruction. Justin judged this
insistence as evidence that the Aristotelian was
not a philosopher, for one does not sell access to
divine things. Doing so is sophistry and, as such,
foolishness, the very antipode of wisdom. Justin
next turned to a Pythagorean teacher who
demanded that Justin first study mathematics,
geometry and astronomy. He had no stomach for
such demanding preconditions and so turned to
the Platonists. From his Platonic teacher he
learned of incorporeal things. He named the
effect of this learning in classically Platonic fashion: “it added wings to my mind.”6 However,
only folly resulted: “I fully expected immediately

to gaze upon God, for this is the goal of Plato’s
philosophy.” 7
At this point, Justin met an old man who introduced him via Socratic irony to the Christian religion. The old man begins by asking after the purpose of Justin’s earnest pursuit of wisdom. “Is it
just about lingual facility as the sophists teach,”
he asks, “or is it about living well?”8 Justin’s
response contests the disjunction: “To prove that
reason rules all and [then] to rule it and be sustained by it is precisely to be enabled to live
well.”9
In short, philosophy for Justin, in these, his
Platonic days, unites all other human pursuits into
a unity and gives them value. And that means
that philosophy produces or at least aims to produce happiness, or the flourishing life—eudaemonia. Of course, he does not mean just any philosophy but the philosophy of Plato. And so the
old man engages this Platonic way of seeing philosophy and its connection to happiness, and he
exposes its vanity. His arguments come down to
this: Even if Platonic claims are true, what good
does philosophy do? How does it increase our
eudaemonia?
Justin’s Christian Socrates is here exhibiting a
fine sense of irony and knowledge of philosophical argument, for this argument is an adaptation
of Aristotle’s against Plato’s account of the causal
force of the Forms. Aristotle, in Metaphysics 1.9,
had granted to Forms what he called a formal
causality as the exemplars of things or sources of
what-things-are within our sensible world.
Nevertheless, he denied that their formal causality could in any way account for the movement of
bodies and, hence, account for the continuity and
change that we experience in our day-to-day
embodied living. After all, formal causes are not
efficient causes, and it is efficient causes that act
as movers in our world of concrete experience or
perception (991a.8-33).
In this passage, Justin is forced to acknowledge
slowly but unavoidably in the course of conversation that Platonic claims do not and cannot
increase our eudaemonia. This answer leaves
Justin asking where he is to go in his pursuit of
wisdom if the philosophers, even the Platonic
philosophers, do not know the truth? The old
man turns him to the scriptures and the God
revealed there as Father-Creator and Christ-Son.
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The old man admonishes him to “examine these
writings with your philosopher’s questions and
you will learn at last the true answers to those
questions.”10 Moreover, he insists that Justin keep
at least one Platonic habit and come to his examination in prayer: “beseech God to open to you
the gates of light, for no one can perceive or
understand these truths unless he has been
enlightened by God and His Christ.”11
Here, we see already a pattern of Christian
thinking about Christian scholarship that will witness a dizzying number of variations throughout
subsequent Christian experience. The deepest
impulses of scholarly inquiry find and can only
find their fulfillment in a lived relationship with
the Scriptures, or rather the God they reveal. All
Christian scholarship is then in some sense scriptural scholarship, i.e., scholarship not so much
about the Scriptures as aligned to them. This
sense of things marks out a common ground
throughout the Christian era and among all of the
academies that Christian communities have cultivated. Of course, common ground is not the same
thing as neutral ground. For what precisely constitutes this alignment with the Scriptures? In
particular, what role do assumptions about life
and knowing that come from outside of the scriptures play? What, for example, are we to make of
Justin’s old man’s missionary playing on platonic
identification of knowing with illumination, and
of sight with Truth?12 How do we map this playing with Plato onto the datum of scriptural revelation that the Christ whom we meet in the Gospel
of John is at one and the same time the Truth and
the Light?13 Where does Plato end and St. John
begin? Can there be no St. John without Plato?
And what of Plato himself? Can there be Plato
without at least Moses and the prophets?14 Such
are the sorts of questions that have punctuated
Christian debate in and since Justin’s day.
Of course, it could be argued that Justin lets us
see a second thing as well, another through-line,
it might be said, knitting the hundred or so generations of Christian scholars and their scholarship
together. When Justin looks to scripture in order
to align his own thinking, he does so as one
already formed to a philosophical lexicon of
Greek and pagan origin. When he meets
homonyms in the Scriptures, he assumes that they
are in fact the same word. Thus he can be said at
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times to have read his antecedent Greek and
pagan meanings into the words of Scripture and
then to have aligned his thinking with the sense of
life, of right and wrong, of flourishing and failing
that emerged from this philosophically intinctured reading. The resultant pattern of eisegesis,
followed by exegesis and subsequent application,
marks out a leitmotif in the history of subsequent
Christian scholarly endeavour.15
We next alight in Augustine’s Hippo. We do so
because Christian scholars in the Latin tradition
(i.e., Catholic and Protestant) have made much of
our Augustinian heritage, in particular his insight
that human understanding of the central mysteries
of life is built upon a foundation of belief, or what
Augustine called “thinking with assent.”16 Our
enthusiasm is unsurprising. If all understanding
is predicated on belief, then an understanding of
the world that is predicated upon Christian belief
is easily imaginable and in fact almost inevitable.
The plausibility of Christian scholarship hardly
necessitates any stretching of the imagination. It
takes its rightful place within the tournament of
ideas alongside all other belief-based understandings of the world. And other such understandings
there must be, for without belief, there is no
understanding.
Augustine shares with Justin Martyr a sense
that Christian faith exists in a world that is culturally older than it and hence in relation to two
antecedent sources of wisdom: Moses and the
prophets on the one hand and the (pagan) philosophers on the other.17 In the light of Christ,
Christian scholars are able to bring each of these
wisdoms to its proper fulfillment. Moses and the
prophets are fulfilled in the Gospel, in the person
of Christ there revealed, and in Christ’s communal presence in this our aging world, the one holy
catholic church. The philosophers are fulfilled,
in turn, in the scriptural revelation of the absolute
origin, end, and proper media of all things.
Christianity’s antecedent wisdoms, then, are
superceded by the faith of the Christian community and by the revelation to which the Christian
community extends its faith even as the God who
reveals makes that faith and community possible.
That is, antecedent wisdom’s aspirations to truth
and happiness are taken up in the Christian religion and realized. Moreover, Augustine shares
with Justin the sense that Platonic philosophy is

superior to that of the other schools of philosophy, though its claims are equally vulnerable to
Christian criticism. Indeed, Augustine pens just
such a criticism in books 8-10 of his City of God.
What Augustine adds to Justin’s enterprise is a
deeper sense of what thinking in alignment with
the Scriptures amounts to. At several points in his
early philosophical writings, he meditates on a
scriptural pericope that he finds in the Old Latin
version of the Book of Isaiah: 7: 9—“Unless they
will believe, they will not understand.” In most
of these citations, he ties the relationship of belief
to understanding to that which authority enjoys
with respect to reason.18 In matters of faith, belief
and authority lay claim to a priority that is proper
to the Christian religion. To believe, says
Augustine, is to hold something to be true (to
think with assent), whether or not that truth can
be demonstrated argumentatively; i.e., to believe
is to take something to be true on authority.
Belief is a prior condition for the exercise of reason within the Christian religion. Subsequent use
of reason leads to understanding. We Christians
properly believe in order to understand.19
Later generations, most notably Reformed
scholars, will capture this Augustinian inflection
in a pseudonymous slogan: credo ut intelligam.
However, is this invocation of Augustine exhaustively Augustinian? Is he always thinking, when
he invokes Isaiah 7: 9, what, for example,
Reformed scholars are thinking when they intone
credo ut intelligam?
On several occasions, Augustine’s meditation
on the priority of belief with respect to understanding and of authority with respect to reason is
the first half of a conceptual diptych.20 In these
passages, Augustine begins by coming to a first
and, I dare say, perfectly “Reformed” conclusion.
But then he stops, as it were, and starts again. He
muses that in order to hold something to be true,
that is, to believe, one must already understand
the terms in which that belief is expressed. Or
rather, in order for the priority of faith to be reasonable, there must be some reason, however
small, that precedes faith.21 So it is simultaneously true that we must understand in order to
believe.
In these latter passages, Augustine is simultaneously affirming that we must believe in order to
understand and that we must understand in order

to believe. So it appears that the widespread and
approving read of this ancient North African bishop on belief and understanding may have been a
trifle inattentive. What are we to make of him
and it when we look at the entire diptych in which
Isaiah 7:9 appears?
The juxtaposition of apparently opposite claims
has a recognizable philosophical pedigree in
Augustine’s world, a pedigree that makes sense in
his life as we shall see. It is a philosophical strategy of the Late Academy, i.e. of ancient Platonic
skepticism.22 The skeptic of the Late Academy
collects arguments of various kinds and logical
forces and practices endlessly employing them
against each other. The point is not to sift à la
Aristotelian philosophy the things we say about
the world so as to be able to judge which claims
and arguments are first and most universal and
hence most securely to be accounted as true.
Rather, the point is to achieve a perfect cognitive
equiposition in which every claim is balanced
against a counterclaim of the exact same logical
texture and force, an aporia (to give it its currently fashionable name). The point is not to facilitate but to impede intellectual judgment and to
suspend belief. What is to result from this cognitive labour is an affective state of mind, tranquillity, the very condition of a flourishing life under
a skeptical description. So, what did Augustine
think he was doing in playing with a scriptural
pericope to create an apparently skeptical aporia
or equiposition of claim and counterclaim?
Augustine was born into a North African
Christian community that could not imagine
either the world of day-to-day experience or the
world encountered in the scriptures in any way
other than in materialist terms.23 North African
Christians were not materialist in the religiously
impious sense of a Karl Marx. Rather, they were
materialist in a religiously pious sense that was
similar to and undoubtedly dependent upon the
religious piety intrinsic to Stoic philosophy.24
That is, North African Catholics tended to be
drawn from the small Latin elites spread throughout the African provinces, elites whose heavily
grammatical and rhetorical education was
focussed upon Virgil, Cicero and a narrow supplement of canonical texts.25 In this body of
authoritative texts, its most philosophical passages were either influenced by, or reflected the
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world that produced, Roman Stoicism. The
Roman Stoic assumed that the material cosmos
itself was intelligent, eternal, and hence divine. It
was a fitting subject of human reverence and
prayer, a fitting object of the human longing for
revelation. Consequently, it is perhaps not surprising that North African Catholics felt it
unproblematic to understand the God whom they
encountered in the Scriptures in any other terms,
and so they found, to us, strangely imaginative
ways to express their intrinsically Christian sense
of the transcendence, immanence, and omnipresence of the provident Creator-God.26
Augustine grew up accepting what he would
later view as this impoverished or carnal
Christianity. Thus, when, as an adolescent, he
read Cicero’s exhortation to the love of wisdom at
school and felt a strange new longing within his
breast, he took materialistic habits of thought and
imagination with him on his new quest.27 If he
did not know what wisdom was, and Cicero had
failed to inform him, he might yet ask after its
opposite, folly. And indeed he received an
answer to this question in stories artfully told by
Faustus and his intrepid band of Latin Manichees.
Folly, or evil, was substantial, a tangible and primary component of our every-day experience. As
such, folly, or evil, was in principle intelligible to
the inquiring human mind. If one could but conceive the nature of folly-evil, one could move out
toward wisdom by a process of conceptual inversion. This search by inversion is what Augustine
was attempting in his nine questioning years as a
Manichaean “auditor.” 28
Nevertheless, his gadfly efforts to explore the
logical consequences of the stories of folly and
evil to be heard among the Manichees met with
Faustian resistance. Augustine became disenchanted but continued to hang on to what he was
coming to suspect were fallacious beliefs. For,
how else was he to move toward wisdom, since
he did not know already what wisdom was? The
skeptics of the Late Academy eventually freed
him from his Manichaean beliefs, and sent him
inadvertently toward the books of the Platonists
and the reality of the spiritual understood as other
than material.29 These books and their teaching in
turn opened him to the preaching of Ambrose,
bishop of Milan, and his eloquent, spiritual
understandings of the Scriptures.30 All of this
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coalesced in his mind to produce a mighty conundrum.
From the Platonists he learned of the philosophical power of introspection, of the great
philosophical project captured in the Delphic slogan, “Know Yourself,” and its coyly hidden codicil, “to be divine.” He was convinced that only
via this inner way does one arrive at a knowledge
that is sure; only so does one access the divine
and see, as it were, what lies at the origin of the
things of our experience and of what we say about
the world. From Ambrose he learned of the prior
authority and luminous power of the Scriptures
spiritually understood. And they were external.
One accessed them via an outer way—literary
studies—and a grounding authority located outside oneself in the assembly of believers. How
were these outer and inner sources of knowledge,
these two loves of wisdom, to be understood in
relation to each other? The struggle to answer
this question constitutes the dynamic animating
much of Augustine’s early philosophical writing,
as a look at two early treatises, the Soliloquia and
the De Magistro, make clear.
In the Soliloquia, Augustine begins by examining our access to the divine within and does so via
a classically introspective and Platonic analysis
of geometric figures: in relation to bodily figures,
on the one hand, and in Truth, on the other.31 He
does so in response to a contingent conundrum or
aporia. If he is to save up what he learns so as to
be able to pass it on to others, he must commit it
to memory. But memory is not able to contain all
that one thinks about, and he is not strong enough
to take everything down onto papyrus and should
not employ a scribe, for what he is seeking
demands solitude. This personal conundrum
drives him to his knees in prayer—a prayer in
which he explores by confessing the desires of his
heart (1.1.1). Indeed, in prayer he discovers what
he longs to know: God and himself and nothing
more (1.2.7).
However, if he is to come to know God and
self, he needs to know what form such knowledge
is to take. Implicit is an adaptation of the
Aristotelian sense that one comes to know what
one does not know via what it is like among the
things one does know. The Aristotelian principle
is then employed in a Platonic project of introspection. What type of internal knowing will

knowledge of God and self be like? What is
knowing God to be like among the set of knowings I already contain in my memory? Does my
memory have a capacity for God?
The initial segment of the Soliloquia represents
a meditation on the types of knowing Augustine
recognizes in his memory and their suitability as
a mode of knowing God. He considers, among
other “knowings,” his knowledge of friends
(1.2.7), of astronomical states of affairs (1.3.8), or
of the quotidian awareness of what he had for dinner the day before (1.3.8). Each knowing proves
insufficient to some belief that he holds about
God. Each is insufficient either because of a disproportion between God as object and the creaturely object being considered (1.3.9), or because
of a disproportion between the act of knowing
and God as its potential object (1.6.12-13).
At one point, he comes to consider knowledge
of geometrical states of affairs (1.4.10-1.5.11). In
the context of this inquiry, he discovers that such
knowledge is separable from corporeal things.
Moreover, it is stable or immutable. So, he asks
himself, is such a knowing sufficient for knowing
God? He thinks not, despite reason’s urging,32 for
he cannot believe that God is like a line or a circle. On the other hand, our capacity for knowing
things eternal allows us to understand ourselves
as in some sense eternal.33 Such an understanding
does raise the possibility that we have a(n as yet
undiscovered) capacity for knowing God. Thus
bolstered, he can continue the search for a knowing fitted to the reality of God. In the course of
continued inquiry, Augustine makes a pregnant
move. He turns to literary science (grammatica)
to see if such science also accesses the changeless
divine (2.11.19). He later expands this examination to include the liberal arts as a whole
(2.20.35). The assumption of literary focus is significant, for if literary science in particular and
the textually and exegetically enclosed liberal arts
in general arrive at knowledge of Truth, and if the
memory can contain them and the Truth they
access, then the aporia of external and internal
wisdom can be resolved, at least in principle. In
other words, I take Augustine to be exploring
whether we contain or can come to contain the
written revelation of God within ourselves. The
Soliloquia ends inconclusively. Platonic introspection and Christian thought in line with the

exterior scriptures remain in antipathetic tension.
They form a stubborn aporia.
In De Magistro Augustine takes up the same
great Platonic theme of the Meno—How do, or
even can, you learn what you do not already
know? Augustine asks whether a human teacher
in fact teaches. It was in and through inquiring
into the possibility of learning what one does not
already know that Plato developed his understanding of knowing as anamnesis, or remembering. Augustine’s conclusions in the De Magistro
have strong family resemblances to this Platonic
doctrine. Nevertheless, he makes important
changes. In particular, he replaces Platonic
remembrance of our divine pre-existence with the
regulative existence “within” of Christ our Inner
Light and Teacher (11.38-14.46). Moreover, he
arrives at this Christ from literary studies, i.e.,
from an examination of a teacher’s words as signs
(1.1-11.37).
The Soliloquia and De Magistro can be understood, then, to form together a chiasm or A-B/BA pattern. The Soliloquia start by considering
and rejecting a variety of “knowings” until they
arrive at what can be called the “internal divine”
of geometrical figures understood in and of themselves rather than in terms of corporeal figures
bearing their impress. They then move to literary
studies. De Magistro starts from literary studies,
or the science of signs both spoken and written
and the things they signify, and moves to the
“internal divine” of Christ the Inner Teacher. But
even De Magistro leaves Augustine with the aporia brought to light in the Soliloquia. For we are
left asking the question: what is the relationship
between the interior Christ caught sight of in
philosophical introspection and the exterior
Christ we encounter in the scriptures?
In the Confessions, Augustine wrestles with
this aporia again along with or, better, in terms of
others. For example, already in the first chapter
of the first book Augustine moves interrogatively
from one conundrum to another until a circle has
been circumscribed. He moves from praise to
knowledge or understanding and back. He moves
from invocation and confession to believing in
and back again to invocation and confession
(1.1.1). Having identified confession with invocation, he moves on to ask where God and his
Christ are to be called into since God is ubiqui-
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tous. This question leads him to the conundrum
of whether God is best understood as in the creature or the creature in God (1.2.2). And this question leads in turn to a consideration of what containing might mean in this context: our containing
God and God’s containing us (1.3.3). God
prompts a plethora of further aporias: never
new/never old; making all things new/working
ever ancient of days, always acting/always at rest,
seeking/though nothing is ever absent, loving/
though never languishing, striving/though never
anxious, wrathful/but at peace, changing works/
not counsel, receiving what is found/though nothing is lost, never penurious/though taking joy in
profit, never greedy/though demanding usury,
taking on debt/though all others have only what is
his, paying debt/owing nothing (1.4.4). And the
mystery of a God who can only be invoked
aporetically leads to questions of loving and
being loved (1.5.5-6). How is such a God to be
loved? Why should such a God demand my love?
Surely only such a God can peal back the shrouds
that veil him in mystery?
The Confessions can be understood as
Augustine’s search for answers to the questions
thrown upon his conscious mind by his opening
prayer. Augustine answers that Christ, the Word
of God, who holds within his bosom the original
secret of every creature, is to be found introspectively in the darkest recesses of our deepest
selves, our memory (10.17.26). When we come
upon him, however, we find ourselves no longer
exactly within but vertiginously elevated in and
by light radiating from above. That is, we come
to be in and to gaze at the light of the Word
through a gauzy firmament marking the boundary
between our deepest within and the divine above
(13.15.16-18). And what might that mediating
boundary be? The Scriptures received in our
memory through Christian formation—catechesis, preaching, disciplined meditation upon
scriptural phrasings (13.12.13)—constitute that
mediating boundary. In and through the internalized words of Scripture, we access the light of the
Word above where the inspiring sun shines without limit. This supernal Word encountered introspectively is the ultimate source of all that is and
is the regulator or measure of our understanding
of all that is (13.16.19). Thus, the search of self
for knowledge ends up, if so blessed, in a know-
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ing of God and the creation in God, but only as
that divine knowing is mediated by the Scriptures
written on the heart.
This is Augustinian Christian scholarship, what
Augustine himself termed philosophia christiana.
Again, we see Christian learning as a project of
thinking in line with the scriptures, themselves
understood as divine revelation. Moreover, in a
much more reflective way than we see Justin
Martyr, we see Augustine importing Platonic
habits of thought into this scriptural learning. In
general, the process of importation is ruled to the
aporia of believing and understanding that we
observed in several of Augustine’s treatments of
Isaiah 7: 9. We believe the claims of the scriptures in order to understand ourselves, our God,
and the world of creatures implicit in understanding our God. However, we must first understand
the words that the Scriptures use in order to make
their claims. And it is on this side of the aporia
that Plato, Aristotle, and the wisdom of Egypt or
of the East could be of crucial, limited service.
As with Justin, we see Augustine working
within a hermeneutic that has been termed the
eisegesis-exegesis method of reading the
Scriptures. Some have seen this method as constitutive of the Christian community’s mortally
flawed first attempts to capture the conceptual
clarity of pagan philosophical modes of expression and inquiry and to put them at the service of
the Christian community in its living with the
Scriptures.34 The intent is clear and honourable:
to think in line with the Scriptures. The result is
often far less happy. Forms of understanding are
identified with the Scriptures themselves that produce discourse, making it hard, if not absolutely
impossible, to say what one knows in one’s bones
that a Christian must say.35
In all of this, I have yet to address the role
Augustine assigns to aporias, i.e., to equipositions
of claim and counterclaim, in his philosophia
christiana. As noted above, in the Late Academy,
aporias were the conceptual means to a non-conceptual end, the tranquillity that resulted from the
suspension of belief. Augustine’s aporias serve
an analogous function.
The seat of human personhood is identified in
Augustinian parlance with “mind” (mens).36
Augustine does not mean thereby our cognitive
powers, narrowly conceived. Rather, his is an

altogether grander notion. Mind is the seat of all
those capacities we have that allow us to be
agents of our actions. In Augustinian shorthand,
mind is the intrinsic principle of life, our kind of
life. Mind can be thought of in its relation to our
bodily living. Then we name it soul. It can be
thought of in relation to our spiritual living. Then
we name it spirit. It can be thought of in terms of
our cognitive functions. Then we call it reason or
intellect. It can be thought of in relation to our
affective functions. Then we call it will or
appetite. It can be thought of in relation to our
perceptual functions. Then we call it sense or
sensuality.
When we think of mind in its depths, we think
of memory. And when we think of mind in its
culminating height, we call the mind “heart”
(cor).37 The proper act of the heart, the seamless
fusion of intellection and desire, is called love
(amor), the very end of which is enjoyment
(fruitio).38 We properly enjoy only God. All else
we relate to in our search for God; all else we
merely use.39 Intellection alone cannot attain to
enjoyment, nor can desire alone. Only the concert of intellection and desire, when directed
toward its properly divine object, achieves the
enjoyment of love. So a cognitive or intellectual
search for knowledge of self and God cannot succeed. Such a search must be wedded to desire if
it is to meet the conditions of its end. In the love
of God, you could say, love, true love, only
begins in “the failure” of intellect. This is the
context in which aporias have a role to play.
When our intellects encounter them, in all
earnestness, the fires of longing are stoked. In
those fires, affect is smelted together with an
intellect that has learned to bow to its own failure
with humility and without regret. What is produced is love, that cordial, you might say, that we
enjoy by the grace and mercy of God.40
Conclusion
From Justin we learn that Christians have
always understood Christian scholarship to be a
matter of thinking in line with the Scriptures in
their witness to divine revelation. Augustine
agrees, if in his own and far more prolix way.
And from Augustine we learn two other things
that are equally enduring assumptions of
Christian scholars. First, Christian scholarship is
never the end; it is always but a means to non-

scholastic ends, ultimately, the love of God, i.e.,
the love of God and the love of self, neighbour,
and all creation as the joyfully excessive gift of
that first love. Second, because Christian scholarship is always a means, it is always understood,
in some sense, as in the muddle of the middle; its
results are always provisional. Scholarship
occurs always too late to see the origin of what it
would understand, and always too early to see the
implications of the understanding it produces.
This observation entails three implications. First,
scholarship always emerges out of what is prior
and deeper than itself. It flows from hunches,
prejudices, or presuppositions; out of intuitions,
circumspective conceptions, or ground-ideas; out
of control beliefs, principles, or articles of faith.
There are many philosophically and religiously
loaded ways of identifying the “what” we are
talking about here. Augustine refers to this complex as authority (auctoritas). Second, because it
is made possible by what is prior and deeper—the
distillate of one’s individual and communal living
with the Scriptures (or rather the God revealed
there)—Christian scholarship is always willynilly an integral expression or better extension of
what one understands that distillate to be. Third,
the scholarship, so produced because it is produced for an end that transcends itself, is to be
judged in some measure by the outcomes it fosters. Such posterior judgments can be directed in
two ways. They can fall on any element intrinsic
to the scholarship itself. Alternatively, scholarship can be directed at the prior sense of what it
means to think in line with the Scriptures or whatever else one thinks in line with.
My claim here is that all of what I have just
been listing stakes out a common ground that all
Christian scholars of whatever era and Christian
academy share at the level of deepest intention.
We all intend our scholarship to be a seamless
piece of our total living with the Scriptures and
our total worship of the God revealed therein. So
we are all one at the level of intention, despite our
differences. There are differences of import, of
course. There are differences of orientation and
strategy that divide persons and communities
committed to the project of integral Christian
scholarship. In light of these differences and their
importance, it is good to be reminded from time
to time of the astonishingly trans-temporal and
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trans-communal oneness hidden at the level of
deep intention. Indeed, that is a unity well worth
remembering.
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